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Abstract
Despite blockchain based digital assets trading since 2009, there has been a functional gap between (1)
on-chain transactions and (2) trust based centralized exchanges. This is now bridged with the success
of Uniswap, a decentralized exchange. Uniswap’s constant product automated market maker enables the
trading of blockchain token without relying on market makers, bids or asks. This overturns centuries of
practice in financial markets, and constitutes a building block of a new decentralized financial system. We
apply ARDL and VAR methodologies to a dataset of 999 hours of Uniswap trading, and conclude that its
simplicity enables liquidity providers and arbitrageurs to ensure the ratio of reserves match the trading pair
price. We find that changes in Ether reserves Granger causes changes in USDT reserves.
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Highlights
• Uniswap is a decentralized exchange based on user provided liquidity reserves.
• Ratio of liquidity reserves are cointegrated with the token price off Uniswap.
• During the sample period Ether reserves Granger causes changes in USDT reserves.
• Decentralized exchanges are a financial primitive that may enable novel use cases.
1. Introduction
On 1 September 2020, USD 953 million worth of digital tokens traded on the Uniswap decentralized
exchange (DEX) in a single day. These trades utilized almost USD 2 billion of committed liquidity.1. In the
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prior week, the platform’s volumes had already exceeded the volumes of the largest centralized cryptoasset
exchange Coinbase.2 Two weeks later, Uniswap would issue its own digital governance token and airdrop
(i.e. give away for free) at least 15% of its ultimate value to its prior users. As of 2 November 2020 the fully
diluted market cap of the Uniswap governance token was USD 484 million.3
Although the record keeping functionality of blockchains make them natural payment and token transfer
mechanisms, significant blockchain token trading takes place on centralized exchanges. These venues offer
consistent transaction costs, fast settlement and optimized user interfaces. The most visible negative of such
venues are the regular hacks, and occasional exchange collapses, that jeopardize the assets they custody.
Gandal et al. (2018) examines the fall of the Mt Gox exchange as well as the increasing price manipulation
leading up to the actual event. Only recently have DEXs gained significant share of cryptoasset volumes
relative to centralized exchanges. Lin (2019) identifies four dimensions across which exchanges can be
decentralized, including (1) the blockchain platform, (2) the mechanism for discovering a counterparty, (3)
the order matching algorithm and (4) transaction settlement. Choices regarding these functions impact an
exchange’s trade off between performance, privacy and reserves requirements. Lin (2019) enumerates the
benefits of DEXs as (1) lower counterparty risk, (2) potentially lower fees, and (3) more trading pairs. Trends
favoring a switch towards DEXs include (1) increasing quantity of distinct cryptoassets, (2) the regulatory
risk of listing a cryptoasset on a centralized exchange, and (3) user preferences to avoid Know Your Customer
and Anti Money Laundering (KYC/AML) regulations required by a centralized exchange. Centralized
exchanges are a focus of regulatory actions, with the CFTC and SEC charging the derivatives platform
Bitmex with providing US based customers access to unregulated financial derivatives, and not following
AML requirements CFTC (2020). In the UK, FCA (2020) banned the sale of derivatives that reference
cryptoassets to retail investors. Importantly, the FCA has not banned the trading of cryptoassets. Uniswap
and other DEXs are not offering derivatives, but it is clear that both regulation and cryptoasset markets
continue to evolve at speed. Alexander and Heck (2020) observes the problems arising from inconsistent
regulation of cryptoasset and derivative markets. DEXs will exacerbate these differences.
Traditional exchanges bring all parties to a single marketplace and depend on specialists to provide
liquidity. Both they and early DEXs utilize order books of bids and asks. The bid consists of prices and
volumes participants are openly willing to buy at. The ask consists of prices participants are willing to sell
at. If the same party engages on the bid and the ask at the same time, they are a specialist or market maker,




income statement variables impact time variation in liquidity - in other words spreads widen when specialist
participants have large positions or lose money. Given sufficient transaction flow, market makers may not
be required to provide liquidity to a market. However a more revolutionary alternative to a bid-ask based
financial market is a disintermediated reserve based model that holds pools of assets that traders can access.
Figure 1: Ether and Tether reserves for the ETH-USDT pair on Uniswap
Uniswap is such a model. Liquidity providers (LPs) commit proportionate quantities of two cryptoassets
to form the basis of a trading pair (Figure 1 shows the reserves for the ETH-USDT pair). In return LPs
receive 0.3% of the value of trades. Angeris and Chitra (2020) notes how Uniswap applies a constant product
rule to these reserves to map them to a marginal price. Further detail on these mechanics are provided in
subsection 2.2. We utilize a dataset of 999 hours of cryptoasset reserves for the ETH-USDT pair from
Uniswap, and explore the research question: are DEXs, in particular Uniswap, an effective cryptoasset
exchange? We examine this question with three testable hypotheses.
• H1: The price of the ETH-USDT Uniswap pair matches its exchange rate off Uniswap.
In a centralized exchange, market makers and participants ensure varying degrees of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (Fama, 1970). Uniswap has discarded this strategy, and therefore it is logical to test the connec-
tion between prices on and off Uniswap. Cointegration of the ratio of reserves and non-Uniswap pricing is a
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necessary condition of the efficiency and effectiveness of Uniswap. It is where the pricing curve of Uniswap’s
constant product market maker equates to the price off platform. We formulate a series of equilibrium
correction Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) models in order to test this hypothesis.
• H2: The price of Ether, Bitcoin and the volume of transactions provide information that help predict
changes in Uniswap reserves.
Here we examine which independent variables assist in predicting changes in reserve balances. Additionally,
ARDL requires that there is at most one cointegrating relationship with the dependent variable.
• H3: Changes in one reserve balance, of a pair, cause changes in the other reserve balance.
ARDL does not prove causality. Therefore we apply a VAR model, and its test of Granger causality, to see
if changes in one reserve balance of a pair, influences the other reserve balance.
Our results provide evidence that the the Uniswap exchange is an effective cryptoasset exchange. We find
a surprising relationship between the price of Bitcoin and underlying reserves. Our VAR analysis suggests
that over the study period, changes in Ether reserves Granger causes changes in Tether reserves. The
effectiveness of Uniswap has significant implications for the expansion of use cases for decentralized finance.
Although blockchain promised the ability to digitally trade anything, in practice there has not necessarily
been the liquidity for it. Reserve based markets imply that trades can now be carried out at any price and
at any volume, enhancing the completeness of financial markets. Furthermore, decentralized marketplaces
will challenge the objectives and enforcement capabilities of regulators. In particular, decentralizing the
exchange eliminates the venture’s need for a registered address and permanently located infrastructure,
and therefore reduces the surface it exposes to the authorities. The next section provides background to
decentralized finance and Uniswap’s pricing mechanism. Following that are sections on Data, Methodology,
Results and Discussion. The research closes with a short Conclusion.
2. Background
2.1. Blockchain, speculation and decentralized finance
Blockchain has become synonymous with digital tokens like those traded on Uniswap. However there
is more to the technology than this. We highlight five threads. The first is as a mechanism to enable
decentralized record keeping - and exemplified by Maersk and IBM’s TradeLens project that records the
movement of 60% of the world’s shipping containers (Jensen et al., 2019). A corollary of a record all agree
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with is that it is accepted as “true”, with a commensurate reduction in trust requirements. This may later
enable decentralized organization and decision making. Secondly are the smart contracts coded on the
blockchain, that are commonly used to issue and manipulate third party tokens, but may in future open up
new types of automation and agent relationships. Shared code, that all agree to be “true”, can be thought
of as shared rules. Cong and He (2019) provides a formal proof of how a blockchain based consensus, using
smart contract based prices contingent on delivery, can support new entrants. In their paper, new entrants
signal quality by trustlessly guaranteeing buyers compensation if the product fails, explicitly increasing the
completeness of the contract space. The shared computer code referred to as smart contracts do not come
with guarantees. Rather any consequences are public prior to interaction. The third thread are digital
tokens. It is noted that both record keeping and tokens can be separately used to enable payments and
the transfer of value. However it is with tokens that we enter the field of tokenomics, and their ability
to reduce project networking costs. Catalini and Gans (2016) implicitly divide these cost reductions into
venture bootstrapping, where tokens are sold to investors or incentivize employees; and platform scaling
where tokens are offered to miners to process transactions, or to evangelize users.
The fourth thread is the ease of deploying a payment system. There is circumscribed need for a new
electronic currency that is a close substitute with bank deposits. However there is a large opportunity in a
novel payments infrastructure. The United States and its allies control the SWIFT international payments
system and the clearance of dollars - used to both cut off Iran and sanction multinational companies (Majd,
2018). Critically, a blockchain based Chinese Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) would bootstrap a new
payments system that can operate largely separate from the SWIFT international payments system. BOE
(2020) discusses the potential resiliency benefit of a core payment network that sits outside the commercial
banking system. But it only touches on why this facilitates features such as negative interest rates: a
blockchain based CBDC hands the payment system, deposit accounts and its data to a single system owner.
The fifth thread is conversely the ability of using decentralization to break rules. The rise of blockchain
tokens have facilitated online crime and money laundering. Foley et al. (2019) use a variety of network
analyses, such as transactions with known dark web wallets, to estimate that one quarter of Bitcoin users
were involved with illegal activities, equating to USD 76 billion in transactions. “Cryptocurrencies are
transforming...black markets by enabling black e-commerce”, Foley et al. (2019, Page 1798). However, the
evolution and use of digital tokens suggest that illicit activities are not the primary use case of digital tokens.
Firstly, Brainard (2020) observes that the money-like use cases of (1) means of exchange, (2) store of value
and (3) unit of account, (which Dwyer (2015) argues were never well addressed by Bitcoin) have increasingly
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been taken over by stablecoins. BOE (2020) defines cryptoassets as “a type of private asset that depends
primarily on cryptography and distributed ledger or similar technology as part of their perceived or inherent
value”, and stablecoins as a type of cryptoasset “whose value is linked to another asset”, i.e. the US dollar.
The most popular stablecoin is the Tether digital token (USDT). It is 5% of the value of all cryptoassets,
compared to 60% for Bitcoin, but manages double the transaction value.4 Such stablecoins are unsuited to
illicit activities as they are typically centralized and easily frozen by their issuers.5
Despite the growth of cryptoassets for payments, it is possible that the leading use case for digital tokens
is speculation. Unfortunately this is difficult to address empirically. Lo (2017) argues that the price action
of Bitcoin is consistent with it being traded as a proxy for the prototyping phase of a new technology. Ciaian
et al. (2017) use an ARDL methodology to find a variety of relationships between Bitcoin, altcoins and a set
of macroeconomic variables. Tan et al. (2020) examine the Garman and Klass volatility of 102 cryptoassets.
These papers reveal relatively little consistency and connection between any of these digital assets. Arthur
et al. (2016) review the differences between gambling, speculation and investing. The key distinctions are
expected value (EV) and variability of returns. Speculation involves a higher EV than gambling (where
negative EV is the norm), and higher variability than investing. Lo and Medda (2020) examines a set
of ICO tokens issued in 2017 categorized by token function, and highlights the large quantity of funds
directed to a set of ventures that consisted of little more than a white paper and a website. Although
a number of these projects are still in operation, none have a noteworthy number of users. Other than
Bitcoin, Ether and stablecoins, few other cryptoassets have retained share of value of the space. This is
not to deride the importance of speculation. Both venture capital and oil drilling (prior to the invention of
seismic surveying) observe a high number of project failures. In particular in the crypto space, these flows
of funds have been critical to the creation of decentralized building blocks, known as primitives. Uniswap is
one of the primitives of the wider space known as Decentralized Finance (DeFi). Multicoin Capital founder
Kyle Samani defines DeFi as ”Enforcing financial contracts through code running on censorship resistant and
permissionless public blockchains”.6 Other large players in DeFi include Curve in the lending and borrowing
of cryptoassets, and Synthetix in cryptoasset derivatives.7 The DeFi space has become popular for liquidity
mining or yield farming, where ether, stablecoins and other assets are committed and rewarded. Part of






handed out by the venture for platform scaling. Yearn.finance8 is an example of how primitives are building
blocks. Deposits on its platform are moved around cryptoasset pools such as Curve’s, trading on Uniswap
as necessary, in order to maximize potential rewards. The emergence of DeFi has exacerbated congestion
and operation costs (i.e. gas fees) on the Ethereum network, similar to the situation on the Bitcoin network
in 2018. Proof of work blockchain networks are capacity constrained by design (Lo and Medda, 2018). It is
how Nakamoto consensus blockchains, such as Bitcoin, enable decentralization and censorship resistance.








Figure 2: Uniswap constant product automated market maker
A constant product automated market maker (AMM) ensures that the reserves before and after the
trade (assuming no fees) adhere to the function:
RαRβ = k (1)
Rα is the quantity of reserves of asset α; Rβ is the quantity of reserves of asset β; and k is a constant.
Equation 1 is plotted in Figure 2. Where trades do not change the ratio of reserves i.e. small, price
pαβ = Rβ/Rα. This is the slope of the tangent where the current mix of reserves intersect the curve.
Reserves following a purchase of α adhere to (Rα − ∆Rα)(Rβ + ∆Rβ) = k. The marginal price of a new
transaction is trivially the relative change in quantity of the two reserves pαβ = ∆Rβ/∆Rα. This is the slope
of the line joining the before and after points on the curve. The slippage (realized price less than market
price) of a trade is positively correlated with trade size and inversely correlated to the size of reserves.
8yearn.finance/dashboard
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Angeris and Chitra (2020) generalizes the mathematics of constant product market makers, and argues
that they work because they provide a tractable optimization problem for arbitrageurs to synchronize on
and off chain price data for a pair of cryptoassets. It should be clear that on a traditional exchange, the
price of an asset lies between the bid and the ask, but that this does not apply on DEXs such as Uniswap.
Market makers are price setters based on their interpretation of supply and demand, but liquidity providers
are price takers. LPs have no price protection other than the constant product function, and this treats
price as an output. Because arbitragers capture some of the value of price changes, the assets of an LP
excluding fees will underperform a fixed portfolio of the original assets, unless price reverts (Angeris and
Chitra, 2020). This is deceptively referred to as impermanent loss. The CEO of Uniswap Hayden Adams
has referred to LPs as “Long fees/volatility and short volatility/fees”9 In other words LPs benefit from fees
which are a function of volatility, but suffer from price change volatility. Separately, traders can specify
a maximum deviation relative to an external price oracle, to protect themselves from short term reserve
fluctuations. In particular, large trades on Uniswap are vulnerable to front running, where bots watch the
mempool of Ethereum’s unprocessed trades, and look to buy before and sell after a market moving trade.10
3. Data
The study is based on closing hourly Uniswap data for the period midnight 18 August 2020 to 2pm 28
September 2020, via a 1000 hour query of the Uniswap V2 subgraph.11 Subgraphs are a way of storing
public data, and accessible via Graph Query Language (GQL). As the final hour is incomplete, 999 hours
are retained. The Uniswap subgraph does not contain hourly price data, only daily price data. Therefore
we acquire via API the matching 999 hours of closing ETH-USDT price from the Cryptocompare.com
data aggregator. We do not know the relationship between Cryptocompare’s benchmark exchange rate (a
composite of unknown weights) and the third party pricing oracle utilized by Uniswap. Descriptive statistics
for a selection of dataset variables are shown in Table 1. Total reserves for the pair in USD are charted
against trading volumes in Figure 3. The large drop in reserves and volumes in the middle of the chart
relates to a copy cat exchange SushiSwap, that offered token incentives to LPs willing to switch to their






N Mean St dev Min p50 Max
Ether reserves, tokens 999 254,727 208,648 11,195 219,063 611,322
USDT reserves, tokens 999 93,533,764 73,919,675 4,704,488 81,763,952 220,368,144
Total reserves, USD mil 999 186 147 9.43 163 439
Ether transaction volume, ETH/hr 999 6,462 5,850 559 4,932 58,799
USDT transaction volume, USDT/hr 999 2,421,322 2,122,218 226,818 1,846,440 20,523,222
ETH reserves * USDT reserves 999 3.91e+13 4.46e+13 5.31e+10 1.81e+13 1.34e+14
Ratio of reserves USDT to ETH 999 381 31.8 319 381 483
ETHUSDT close price, USD 999 381 31.7 319 381 483
BTCUSDT close price, USD 999 10,977 596 9,946 10,883 12,352
Diff in log Ether reserves 998 .00383 .0746 -1.97 .00168 .668
Diff in log USDT reserves 998 .00366 .0749 -1.97 .00152 .67
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - 999 hour snapshot of Uniswap ETH-USDT pair
Figure 3: Total reserves and trading volumes for the ETH-USDT pair on Uniswap
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4. Methodology
Hypothesis H1 requires us to test for cointegration between price and the ratio of reserves. This cointe-
gration is central to the effective trading of cryptoassets on Uniswap. Within equilibrium correction ARDL,
the test of cointegration is referred to as the Bounds test. We proceed there via (1) categorizing the vari-
ables by their order of integration; (2) discussing the framework of the ARDL model; and (3) laying out
the equilibrium correction ARDL to which the Bounds test is applied. Although Pesaran et al. (2001) com-
mented that ascertaining the order of integration was unnecessary prior to testing for cointegration under
ARDL, this was asserted in a bounded fashion: the framework does not extend directly to variables that
are integrated of order two I(2). Therefore we test for unit roots using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF),
Phillips-Peron (PP) and Dickey-Fuller GLS (DFGLS) tests. We use the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)
to determine the appropriate number of lags.
ADF PP DF-GLS
level 1st diff. level 1st diff. level level 1st diff.
Statistical significance 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 10% 5%
Ether reserves NS S NS S NS NS S
USDT reserves NS S NS S NS NS S
Ether volumes S S S S NS S @ 19 lags S
USDT volumes S S S S NS S @ 18 lags S
ETHUSDT price NS S NS S NS NS S
BTCUSDT price NS S NS S NS NS S
Ratio of reserves NS S NS S NS NS S
3 tests of stationarity applied to 7 time series, on levels and first differences. NS = non-stationary. S = stationary.
Table 2: Stationarity test results
The results shown in Table 2 indicate that our sample contains a mix of integration orders. Reserves,
ratio of reserves and prices are stationary in the first differences I(1), while volumes are likely to be stationary
in levels I(0). The DF-GLS test applies a generalized least squares (GLS) detrending on the series prior to
running an ADF test, which can improve the power of the test (Elliott et al., 1996). Although both OLS
and GLS based tests see declining power in the presence of level or trend breaks, the risk is in misidentifying
a stationary time series with such a structural break as non-stationary i.e. that the order of integration is
over estimated (Cook and Manning, 2004). Therefore ARDL is appropriate and can be represented thus:






βixt−i + ut (2)
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yt is the dependent variable at time t, with up to p lags included in the model.
xt is the k x 1 vector of independent variables. For simplicity we display here lag order q as the same
for all the independent variables - this does not have to be the case.
ut is a random error term.
c0 and c1 are deterministic intercept and time trend coefficients.
An extension of the model in Equation 2 estimates the long run relationships as an equilibrium correction
process (Pesaran et al., 2001). It frames the independent variables as long run forcing of the dependent
variable (Kripfganz and Schneider, 2020). This assumes the independent variables are weakly exogenous,
and models should consider the directionality of effects during formulation e.g. it may be plausible for
transactions to drive changes in reserves, but it is less likely that reserves force large transactions. With
respect to hypothesis H1, yt becomes the ratio of reserves Rt; while xt are the exchange rates of ETHt and
BTCt with Tether. This is shown in Equation 3.
∆Rt =c0 + c1t+ α(Rt−1 − θ1ETHt−1 − θ2BTCt−1) +
p−1∑
i=1









α is the adjustment coefficient.
θ are the long run coefficients on first lags of ETHt and BTCt.
ω are the short run coefficients on the first differences of ETHt and BTCt.
ϕ are the short run coefficients on the lagged differences of Rt, ETHt and BTCt.
This choice of methodology benefits from its ability to estimate both short run and long run parameters
at the same time. Furthermore, Pesaran and Shin (1999) observes that an appropriate estimation of the
orders of the extended ARDL(p,m) model is sufficient to both correct for the residual serial correlation,
and the problem of endogenous regressors. The ARDL models and coefficients are estimated in Stata
utilizing the ARDL package, which is based on Kripfganz and Schneider (2020). Note that if there is no
cointegration, then the ARDL model in Equation 2 is used to estimate relationships between variables and
their lags. Hypothesis H1 is investigated via a variety of specifications that look for cointegration between
the ratio of Ether and USDT reserves and the exchange rate of ETH-USDT. Hypothesis H2 utilizes the
same methodology and searches for the presence of cointegrating and auto regressive relationships between
reserves, transactions and price. These models are subjected to two parts of the ARDL Bounds test.
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Cointegration implies that there are stationary equilibrium relationships between separate non-stationary
variables. A corollary of this is that when these variables diverge, at least one of the cointegrated variables
converges back to return the system to a long run equilibrium. In Equation 3 the rate of this is estimated
by the coefficient α. The Bounds test begins with a Wald test (F-statistic) of the joint hypothesis HF
0
that
α = 0 and
∑q
i=0 ϕxi = 0, versus the alternative hypothesis H
F
1
that α 6= 0 and
∑q
i=0 ϕxi 6= 0. If the null
hypothesis is rejected, then the t-statistic is used to test the second Ht
0
of α = 0 versus Ht
1
of α 6= 0. The
distributions of these test statistics are nonstandard and depend on the integration order of the independent
variables. Kripfganz and Schneider (2020) extend the set of available critical values for the bounds test via
estimating response surface models, with each significance level showing four critical values based on I(0) and
I(1) for the F-test and t-tests. There can be at most one cointegrating relationship between the independent
variables and the dependent variable (although there may be additional cointegrating relationships between
the independent variables). The validity of the bounds test depends on normally distributed error terms
that are homoskedastic and serially uncorrelated. For the equilibrium correction ARDL model for the ratio
of ETH/USDT reserves to ETHUSDT price, we carry out the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation,
and the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity. The coefficients need to be stable over time. Kripfganz
and Schneider (2020) notes that Bounds testing with higher lag order can be useful for addressing remaining
serial error correlation, with a more parsimonious model applied after testing for forecasting purposes.
Across our analysis AIC, which indicates the optimality of a model, is used to select the set of variables and
the number of lags. AIC is less parsimonious than Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), but in
ARDL lowers the risk of serial correlation.
Moving on, hypothesis H3 requires an alternative methodology to test for Granger causality. We imple-
ment a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model to analyze directional changes in cryptoasset reserves. VAR
modeling specifies as many models as dependent variables (Enders, 1995). We use first difference of logs,
to ensure the linearity of changes in the two rapidly increasing reserve balances. In a basic form of two
variables with a single lag, VAR modeling would define two equations thus.
∆(lnETHt) = αu + βu1∆(lnUSDTt−1) + ǫu (4)
∆(lnUSDTt) = αe + βe1∆(lnETHt−1) + ǫe (5)
Variables are considered endogenous. Although it is possible to selectively use lags, typically each model
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repeats the same lagged explanatory variables symmetrically. This way it can be argued that VAR modeling
is theory-free with no preconceptions. The Granger causality tests within the VAR model examine if prior
period first difference of log of one cryptoasset reserve provides information about the value of current period
first difference of log of the other cryptoasset reserve. Tests of Granger causality exploits the directionality
of time to imply the directionality of the relationship. Changes in reserve balances are a corollary of trades
on the Uniswap platform, and following such trades, the mechanism by which arbitrageurs cointegrate the
reserve ratio and price. In the next section we examine the results.
5. Results and discussion
[A] [B]
Adjustment factor
L. (Ratio of reserves) -0.611∗∗∗ -0.613∗∗∗
Long run effects
L. (ETHUSDT price) 1.002∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗
L. (BTCUSDT price) -0.000
Short run effects
LD. (Ratio of reserves) -0.191∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗
L2D. (Ratio of reserves) -0.093∗∗ -0.089∗∗
D. (ETHUSDT price) 0.905∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗
LD. (ETHUSDT price) 0.205∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
L2D. (ETHUSDT price) 0.116∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
L3D. (ETHUSDT price) 0.022 0.021
D. (BTCUSDT price) 0.004∗∗
aic 3450.675 3443.950
bic 3494.800 3497.880





F-test p-value I(1) 0.000 0.000
t-test p-value I(1) 0.000 0.000
Bounds test rejects H0 no level relationship
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3: ARDL - Ratio of reserves and ETHUSDT price
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The results of applying ARDL to our dependent variable, the ratio of Ether to USDT reserves, with the
price of Ether and the price of Bitcoin (both relative to USDT) are shown in Table 3. As all three variables
in this model are I(1), the bounds test statistics are compared to the I(1) critical values. The F-statistic
and the t-statistic are more extreme than the related critical values (p-value = 0.000), which rejects the null
hypothesis of no level relationship. This provides evidence in favor of the first of our testable hypothesis:
• H1: The price of the ETH-USDT Uniswap pair matches its exchange rate off Uniswap.
Figure 4: The ratio of Ether and Tether reserves (on the ETH-USDT pair on Uniswap) versus the ETHUSDT price
This result confirms empirically the effectiveness of Uniswap’s reserve balance based Ether and USDT
exchange pair on an hourly time frame. These results are supported graphically in Figure 4. The lower part
of this figure indicates that some of the arbitrage opportunity is visible in the data, but over the sample
period largely stays under 1%. We note that because of fees, arbitrage is unlikely to take place when the
difference between on and off Uniswap prices are less than 0.3%.
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Returning to Table 3, the short run effects are ϕ and ω from equation 3, which are the coefficients on the
first and lagged differences of our variables. The majority of these coefficients are statistically significant.
The long run effects are the coefficients θ on the, off platform, lagged exchange rates of ETHUSDT and
BTCUSDT. In both specifications, the coefficient on the lagged ETHUSDT price is approximately 1. Of the
long run coefficients, only the one on ETHUSDT is statistically significant. During the study time period,
the adjustment factor α is 0.61. This suggests that 61% of the difference between the ratio of reserves
and the ETHUSDT price is adjusted back to long run equilibrium over the course of the subsequent hour.
There is no specific theoretical reason why the ratio of reserves should be impacted by the price of Bitcoin
BTCUSDT, however the lower AIC value and the statistical significance of the first difference coefficient
suggests the Bitcoin price does contain information in predicting changes in the ratio of reserves. This may
be because of Bitcoin’s importance in the cryptoasset space; its impact on trader wealth; or some residual
use as a unit of account. We run a Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation, which does not reject the
null of no serial correlation for 1 lag and 5 lags at the 5% significance level, but does reject the null for 2-4.
We force higher lags on the dependent variable and rerun the bounds test and observe similar results (not
shown). The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity has a χ2 test statistic of 2.6 and a p-value of 0.1069.
Therefore we do not reject the null of constant variance at the 5% and 10% significance levels.
• H2: The price of Ether, Bitcoin and the volume of transactions provide information that help predict
changes in Uniswap reserves.
In order to explore our second hypothesis H2, we put the ratio of reserves to one side, and run ARDL
models with Ether reserves and USDT reserves as our dependent variables. The Bounds tests on these
equilibrium correction models (not shown) do not reject the null hypothesis of no level relationship - we find
no evidence of cointegration. Because of this, the equilibrium correction models are not appropriate, and
the results of the standard ARDL model are presented in Table 4 and 5. For both dependent variables, we
execute 3 models with different independent variables, and rank them by AIC. The lower the AIC the more
appropriately specified the model. For both Ether reserves and USDT reserves the most general models with
the most variables appear to be preferred in predicting changes in the dependent variables. Reserves are a
function of (1) liquidity provision in a ratio set by price and (2) trades that exchange one reserve for another
at a price dependent on impact. Therefore the presence of statistically significant relationships between these
variables are within expectations. The statistical significance of Bitcoin is a surprise, while the statistical
significance on volumes is somewhat weaker. Together these results find in favor of our hypothesis H2. The
BIC would rank the models for both dependent variables differently, but would also increase risks of serial
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correlation in the residuals. We test the other variables to ensure no additional cointegrating relationships
that may impact our earlier analysis. Mostly there is no logic for such directionality, and we do not find
such evidence. Over the study time period we also do not find cointegration between the price of Ether and
the price of Bitcoin. The result of this may be different over longer time periods.
[B] [D] [E]
L. (ETH reserves) 0.883∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗
L2. (ETH reserves) 0.102∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(USDT reserves) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
L. (USDT reserves) -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
L2. (USDT reserves) -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(ETHUSDT price) -637.565∗∗∗ -619.692∗∗∗ -518.689∗∗∗
L. (ETHUSDT price) 498.591∗∗∗ 487.398∗∗∗ 374.865∗∗∗
L2. (ETHUSDT price) 96.852∗∗ 94.694∗∗ 118.811∗∗∗
L3. (ETHUSDT price) 28.018 24.263
(ETH volume) 0.483∗∗ 0.540∗∗
L. (ETH volume) -0.346 -0.458∗
L2. (ETH volume) -0.012 -0.009
L3. (ETH volume) 0.020 0.017
L4. (ETH volume) -0.049∗∗ -0.039∗
(USDT volume) -0.001∗ -0.001∗∗
L. (USDT volume) 0.001 0.001∗
(BTCUSDT price) -8.585∗∗∗
L. (BTCUSDT price) 9.367∗∗∗
L2. (BTCUSDT price) -2.946
L3. (BTCUSDT price) 2.571∗
aic 17839.896 17815.129 17796.283
bic 17888.923 17898.476 17894.338
N 995 995 995
Models ordered by AIC descending
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4: Short run ARDL model of Ether reserves within ETH-USDT Uniswap pair
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[F] [G] [H]
L. (USDT reserves) 0.880∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗
L2. (USDT reserves) 0.106∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(ETH reserves) 359.660∗∗∗ 359.814∗∗∗ 359.155∗∗∗
L. (ETH reserves) -316.353∗∗∗ -307.481∗∗∗ -307.090∗∗∗
L2. (ETH reserves) -37.979∗∗ -46.147∗∗∗ -43.853∗∗∗
(ETHUSDT price) 2.36e+05∗∗∗ 2.30e+05∗∗∗ 1.88e+05∗∗∗
L. (ETHUSDT price) -1.87e+05∗∗∗ -1.82e+05∗∗∗ -1.37e+05∗∗∗
L2. (ETHUSDT price) -3.35e+04∗∗ -3.30e+04∗∗ -4.21e+04∗∗∗
L3. (ETHUSDT price) -1.10e+04 -9394.944
(ETH volume) -182.284∗∗ -205.483∗∗
L. (ETH volume) 115.697 159.812∗
L2. (ETH volume) 7.660 6.336
L3. (ETH volume) -8.740 -7.309
L4. (ETH volume) 17.894∗∗ 13.854∗
(USDT volume) 0.430∗ 0.494∗∗
L. (USDT volume) -0.287 -0.409∗
(BTCUSDT price) 3453.907∗∗∗
L. (BTCUSDT price) -3744.165∗∗∗
L2. (BTCUSDT price) 1078.459
L3. (BTCUSDT price) -944.970∗
aic 29585.068 29560.327 29537.154
bic 29634.096 29643.674 29635.209
N 995 995 995
Models ordered by AIC descending
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5: Short run ARDL model of USDT reserves within ETH-USDT Uniswap pair
Our third hypothesis examines how the Uniswap ETH-USDT pair returns to equilibrium.
• H3: Changes in one reserve balance, of a pair, cause changes in the other reserve balance.
We investigate this with a VAR model. We begin by reviewing the order selection statistics for our two
variables. The BIC recommends zero lags but the AIC opts for 3 lags. We run two models, one with 3 lags
and the second with 1 lag. The results of this are shown in Table 6. Tests of model stability suggest that the
Eigenvalues are appropriately within the unit circle. We find a single statistically significant coefficient on the
first difference in log of Ether reserves, when the dependent variable is the first difference in log of USDT




















Models ordered by AIC descending
DLRETH is first difference of log Ether reserves
DLUSDT is first difference of log USDT reserves
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 6: VAR model of Ether and USDT reserves
reserves Granger causes changes in the first difference in the log of USDT reserves at the 5% statistical
significance level (p=0.038). Over this time period we reject the null that first differences in the log of
USDT reserves Granger causes changes in the first differences in the log of Ether at the same significance
level (p=0.089). It is hard to state definitely why this would be the case. However, we can make inferences
from the fact that on Uniswap, no trade is neutral, every trade has a price impact, whether large or small.
Ceteris paribus, arbitrage trades following off Uniswap price changes should not have next period impacts.
Only arbitrage trades following trading induced reserve changes should link two time periods. Arguably
this arbitrage should lead to bidirectional Granger causality. As this is not the case, one possibility is that
arbitrageurs have a slight preference to buy Ether when it is cheap over selling Ether when it is expensive.
The logic for this is that, following a trading induced reserve imbalance, if the next trade impacts USDT
more than Ether, this is by definition of a purchase of Ether along a constant product curve (1 quantum
decline in Ether reserve balance, 1 + x quantum proportionate rise in USDT reserve balance).
18
6. Conclusion
This research provides empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of reserve based asset exchanges. We
find that for a 999 hour period of Uniswap’s existence, including the majority of its reserve build, the ratio
of Ether and USDT reserves on the ETH-USDT pair is cointegrated with a third party ETHUSDT exchange
rate benchmark. For a constant product automated market maker, this cointegration is a necessary condition
of the exchange rate on platform approximating the exchange rate off platform. The success of Uniswap is
a rare example of a financial market operating without the classic features of bids and asks, market makers
or auctioneers. It is a clarion call to regulators, governments and financial market participants that the
innovation and decentralization promised by blockchain based systems is starting to gain traction - with
significant implications for financial trading, stability and regulation. An argument made by Lo and Medda
(2020) is that blockchain does not build strictly superior systems, but alternative systems that are attractive
along less common dimensions, e.g. decentralization and censorship resistance. The question now becomes
how should regulators and governments respond to a marketplace that does not need a registered address
and geographically fixed physical infrastructure? Historically, rule makers have focused on regulating the
institutions of the emerging cryptoasset space (Blandin et al., 2019). This may no longer be possible.
Directions for future research include the potential to add an uncorrelated asset to investor portfolios;
the optimal fee to maximize LP wealth, and whether or not decentralized exchanges are more or less risky
than centralized exchanges.
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